Background
AEDs were originally developed to speed defibrillation in cases of outof-hospital cardiac arrest due to ventricular fibrillation (VF) or pulseless ventricular tachycardia (VT) by enabling more rescuers, including laypeople, to defibrillate. With the support of the AHA and ILCOR, emergency medical services systems began adopting AEDs to enable more providers to defibrillate, with ease of training as the main rationale [1] .
The problem of delayed defibrillation in hospitals was brought to the attention of several AHA leaders in the mid-1980s. They in turn began a concerted push for AEDs in hospitals, based on the recognition that defibrillation was often delayed-and the assertion that AEDs could mitigate the problem by making it possible to train more caregivers, particularly bedside nurses, to defibrillate. AHA/ILCOR formally endorsed the idea in the 2000 ECC Guidelines, in a chapter titled "The Automated External Defibrillator: Key Link in the Chain of Survival [2] ."
Several small studies in the next few years suggested some improvement in hospital survival resulting from the addition of AEDs and replacement of manual defibrillators with dual-mode (AED/manual) devices. But doubts about the technology began to surface: Studies accumulated showing decreased shock efficacy with AEDs due to the hands-off time required for rhythm analysis [3] .
In 2010 a large cohort study (hereafter referred to as the "Chan study") directly compared in-hospital use of AEDs with manualdefibrillator controls, analyzing resuscitation data from the AHA's National Registry for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (NRCPR, now Get With the Guidelines-Resuscitation (GWTG-R)). Analyzing 11,695 arrests in 204 hospitals, the study found that AED use had no significant effect on survival from shockable rhythms and decreased survival from non-tachyarrhythmic arrests [4] . Two single-center studies corroborated this finding [5, 6] .
The AHA's current position appears to be that the recommendation for in-hospital use of AEDs will stand, with a call for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate and optimize use of AEDs in the hospital [7] . The most recent Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC) Guidelines (2015) do not address the issue.
Examining this history using the conceptual model of medical reversal may aid understanding of how AEDs in the hospital came to be accepted as "standard practice," the prospects for change in light of the reversal, and some wider implications for emergency medical research.
New England Journal of Medicine (2001−2010), found a 40% incidence of medical reversal (146 of 363 articles) [9] . The authors discuss at length and build upon a conceptual framework originated by the medical sociologist John McKinlay in his article "From "promising report" to "standard procedure": Seven stages in the career of a medical innovation [10] ."
McKinlay's seven stages are:
• Promising report • Professional and organizational adoption • Public acceptance and state (third party) endorsement • "Standard procedure" and observational reports • Randomized controlled trial (RCT)
• Professional denunciation • Erosion and discreditation.
Promising report
As described by McKinlay, treatments that are later reversed are typically adopted following positive reports, often in the lay press, of results from individual cases or small patient samples. In contrast, the push for AEDs in hospitals began without even this limited evidence. AHA training materials began promoting the idea in the 1990s, based on an extrapolation from out-of-hospital practice. Evidence was then beginning to show some survival benefit from deploying AEDs in out-ofhospital settings where early defibrillation had not been possible before. In hospitals, where manual defibrillators were already readily available, the argument turned on the presumed ease of training and skill retention for nurses who rarely dealt with cardiac arrest-and on the additional assumption that it was not feasible to train those nurses to use manual defibrillators [11] . The present case is therefore somewhat atypical in that the innovation began with no direct evidence, but instead because of advocacy from the AHA, a public-service organization and quasi-regulatory body that develops the ECC Guidelines.
Professional and organizational adoption
The AHA/ILCOR formally endorsed use of AEDs in hospitals in the 2000 ECC Guidelines [2] . That endorsement followed the recommendations of a task force on AEDs, which came despite their acknowledgment that no direct evidence existed supporting use of AEDs in hospitals [12] , and also in spite of studies beginning to show decreased shock efficacy with AEDs [13] . The recommendation was followed by the adoption of AED technology by most American hospitals over the next decade and a half.
Public acceptance and state (third party) endorsement
Of McKinlay's seven stages, this is the least relevant to the current case. AED defibrillation was seen as a variation on an accepted emergency treatment (external defibrillation), so there were no third-party endorsement (i.e., insurance coverage) issues. Nor was public acceptance a particular concern, since the change affected hospital emergency response systems largely out of the public eye and did not involve an elective procedure.
"Standard procedure" and observational reports
The years since the formal endorsement in the guidelines have seen AED technology widely adopted by hospitals, typically by replacing manual defibrillators with dual-mode (manual and AED) devices, to the extent that it is now considered standard practice. Observational reports provided support for the change. McKinlay says that at this stage "observational studies usually suffer crippling methodological limitations," and that is true of the studies that appeared to support in-hospital use of AEDs. Two single-center observational studies reported good survival from VF/VT arrests with AEDs [14, 15] , but both lacked a control group. One study with a historical control did show an improvement in survival to discharge from cardiac arrests in which the patient was defibrillated.
After an intensive hospital-wide education program and placement of AEDs and dual-mode defibrillators throughout the hospital, survival to discharge for shockable rhythms improved to 15.6% (10 of 64 patients) compared to 2.2% (4 of 176 patients) before the program [16] .
Beyond the usual problems with single-center studies using historical controls [17] (or no controls, in the case of two of the studies), these studies share a major weakness. The introduction of AEDs to the hospital is a systems intervention, "a change in how health care is delivered, one that affects how groups of caregivers act or behave in their professional role." Systems interventions are most often evaluated by "before-and-after" studies. Such studies are highly susceptible to the "Hawthorne effect," a well-accepted phenomenon affecting subjects who know their performance is being studied-they tend to perform better on the tasks under study regardless of the intervention [18] . The authors of the latter study, to their credit, acknowledged the possibility that "the improvement in survival was the result of a Hawthorne effect where increased education and awareness rather than the actual experimental conditions were responsible for the outcome [16] ."
Randomized controlled trial (RCT)
McKinlay regards a properly designed and conducted RCT as the best evidence and firmest basis for medical reversal, and Prasad and Cifu concur [19] . Even Chan et al. made a perfunctory call for RCTs [4] . But RCTs are hard to do in general and are especially difficult, and therefore rare, in the realm of resuscitation medicine [20] . Recruitment for studies that test an accepted standard of care is particularly challenging because of possible ethical objections [21, 22] .
Beyond these concerns, other considerations would appear to make an RCT on in-hospital use of AEDs practically impossible. Randomizing between manual and automated defibrillation at the event level is clearly unworkable: blinding would not be possible, and unless first responders were trained in manual as well as AED defibrillation, randomization would require delay in delivering an accepted lifesaving treatment to the manual group-something no institutional review board would likely approve. The only option would seem to be a cluster RCT [23] , which would require participation by hospitals not using AEDs-but the widespread adoption of AEDs by hospitals in the wake of the AHA's endorsement makes enrollment of non-AED hospitals virtually impossible. Even if non-AED hospitals could be found and enrolled, they would necessarily be extreme outliers with respect to resuscitation practices.
It is difficult, then, to regard calls for RCTs as anything more than pro forma, given the enormous problems that would be involved in conducting an RCT of reasonable size comparing AEDs to manual defibrillators-much less one equivalent in size and reach to the Chan study. If RCTs are not a realistic option, we are left with the present evidence for the foreseeable future. That evidence shows that use of AEDs decreases overall survival from cardiac arrest in the hospital setting.
Professional denunciation
In the emotionally charged atmosphere of medical care, the momentum of a new technology too often puts the burden of proof on those who question the evidence for it, rather than on those who propose it. The result is that the technology quickly becomes the accepted thing to do [and] further attempts to test it and subject to the charge of being unethical… [22] .
And per McKinlay:
The issue of double standards is perhaps most evident during this sixth stage involving professional denunciation. The many defective observational studies conducted up to this point seldom receive adequate methodological and statistical scrutiny, whereas RCTs are subjected to the most stringent criticism, employing standards that are almost never invoked during the earlier stages…The nature of the standards invoked, and the force with which they are applied, seem to vary depending on whether or not the results are supportive of what has become standard procedure.
If we substitute "RCTs" in the above quote with "a large multicenter registry-based controlled cohort study," the AHA/ILCOR's only official response to the Chan study provides a good example of McKinlay's observations. That response came in a 2013 Scientific Statement on inhospital resuscitation, in a section on AEDs [7] . Within that section, 62% of the text is devoted to making the argument for AEDs in the hospital and summarizing the positive observational reports discussed previously (with the addition of one that did not involve inpatients [24] ), while failing to mention two observational studies that corroborated the Chan study [5, 6] . The remainder dealt with the Chan study, but most of it (82 0f 143 words, or 57%) was used to cast doubt on the negative results, including the claim that "it is likely that AEDs were placed in areas less well served by the cardiac arrest team, representing a potential selection bias"-despite the study's finding that "relationships between AED use and survival were consistent in monitored and nonmonitored hospital units for each rhythm type." Only 61 words (15% of the section total) were devoted to a straightforward account of the study. The authors wrote that one of the single-center observational studies [16] "showed" an improvement in outcomes, but that the Chan study of 11,695 arrests from 204 hospitals only "suggested" that there was no association with increased survival. The discussion concluded that: "additional randomized clinical trials are required to evaluate and optimize use of AEDs in the hospital," with the question apparently becoming how best-rather than whether-to use AED technology in hospitals.
Erosion and discreditation
McKinlay says of this stage, "After some period of time (often more than a decade), and ever so gradually, an erosion of support begins to set in." The 2015 Guidelines have dropped the 2010 Guidelines' discussion of AED use in hospitals without comment and do not otherwise address the issue. Elsewhere, in describing the "important insights" provided by the GWTG-R registry, the Guidelines omit the 2010 Chan study while citing three studies that are arguably less clinically significant [25] . The 2015 European Resuscitation Council (ERC) Resuscitation Guidelines acknowledge, mainly on the basis of the Chan study, that AED use "may cause harmful delays in starting CPR, or interruptions in chest compressions in patients with non-shockable rhythms," and recommends manual defibrillation when available-but continues to recommend AED defibrillation in areas where "first responders do not have skills in manual defibrillation [26] ." That stance continues to reinforce the assumption undergirding the rationale for AEDs in the hospital: that nurses outside of specialty areas cannot learn to recognize VF without continuing training in rhythm recognition-an assumption that is unproven and may be unfounded [27] .
Prasad and Cifu say that too frequently "[t]he contradicted practice does not stop immediately…[but] continues for years to come" [28] . ECC Guidelines may remain in place for decades despite thin or nonexistent evidence for adoption and the subsequent publication of negative studies [20, 29] . Systems interventions may be especially hard to reverse due to entrenched financial and/or intellectual interests [18] . McKinlay says, "The power of such interests is also evident in their ability to impede the development of alternative practices (for which there may also be considerable observational support) that could conceivably threaten an activity in which there is already considerable investment." An additional factor in the present case may the ubiquity of AEDcapable defibrillators in hospitals today: if the AHA/ILCOR were to retract their endorsement, those devices would serve for many years as concrete reminders of the mistake.
Conclusions
Financial conflicts of interest (COIs) are a major problem in the development of clinical guidelines [30] , and it can be assumed that industry influence was a factor in the present case: the recommendation for in-hospital AEDs represented a windfall for the defibrillator industry, with hospitals adding AEDs and/or replacing their manual defibrillators with dual-mode devices [31] . COI protections are clearly important in formulating the ECC Guidelines, and since 2000, the AHA has strengthened its COI policies [32] .
Large quasi-regulatory bodies/public service organizations such as the AHA, together with government agencies, may have the resources and influence to support and encourage large RCTs of new therapies before they are widely adopted. An example is the study of publicaccess defibrillation with AEDs supported by the AHA and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute [33] . A recent article makes a similar recommendation for the study of extracorporeal cardiopulmonary resuscitation [34] .
Recognition of the problem of delayed in-hospital defibrillation coincided with the rising enthusiasm for AED technology, and promotion by the AHA ensured that the problem was closely linked with that proposed solution. That history has perhaps led to the assumption that if AEDs do not provide a remedy, nothing can. Additionally, because the problem has never been quantified and published time-interval data are artificially short [35] , some have even suggested that delayed defibrillation in hospitals may not be a serious problem [9] . A sense of resignation ("Nothing can be done about it") or complacency ("Perhaps the problem was exaggerated") may color attitudes for years.
One of the harmful effects of this case of medical reversal is of course the millions of dollars hospitals have spent to adopt AED technology. More concerning is the probability that it has led to many deaths of patients presenting with a non-shockable rhythm. A still more serious harm is that it has prevented and continues to obstruct consideration of other approaches to delivering rapid defibrillation, thereby forfeiting the chance to rescue many "hearts too good to die."
